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INTERNATIONAL ICE HOCKEY: PLAYER POACHING AND CONTRACT 
DISPUTE 
Kate Zdrojeski* 
Since the 1990’s, European hockey leagues have relied on player transfer 
agreements to govern the movement of contracted players from their Euro-
pean teams to the U.S. National Hockey League (NHL). Player transfer 
agreements are brokered by the International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF) 
and ensure that European clubs receive compensation for players electing 
to terminate their contracts in favor of new agreements with the NHL. As of 
2007, the IIHF and the NHL had no player transfer agreement in place. 
This lack of an international agreement has resulted in an increase in con-
tract breach, or player poaching. Without an enforceable player transfer 
agreement in place, hockey teams worldwide have no remedy for interna-
tional breaches of contract. This Note first examines the role of the IIHF in 
governing international player transfers and suggests that a new method be 
implemented to regulate international player movement. A “posting” mod-
el, as used in Major League Baseball, will better address the concerns of 
the NHL and IIHF member bodies regarding player transfers while simul-
taneously reducing the incentive for international contract breach. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Few sports enjoy the international presence, global following, and 
dental destruction of ice hockey. Though the U.S. National Hockey League 
(NHL) enjoys a reputation as the world’s premier league, ice hockey is 
hardly America’s game. Countless leagues exist around the globe, with the 
premier talent hailing from European nations such as Russia, Sweden, and 
the Czech Republic.1 However, with the promise of lucrative contracts and 
  
 *   Notes Editor, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law. B.A., Kenyon Col-
lege (2007); J.D., Case Western Reserve University School of Law (expected 2010). Many 
thanks to Dan Ujczo for his counsel, comments and guidance throughout the writing process. 
To my wonderful mother, I am forever grateful for your numerous pep talks, supportive 
words, and unconditional love. You are my greatest comfort and my biggest cheerleader. To 
my amazing father, where would I be without you? Thank you for being my sounding board, 
for pushing me to reach higher, and for believing in me always. 
 1   See Eugene Belashchenko, NHL Transfer Agreement: Do Russians Have a Point?, 
RUSSIAN PROSPECTS, Sept. 19, 2006, www.russianprospects.com/public/article.php?article_ 
id=480 (stating that “Russia is a significant producer of hockey talent and constituted ap-
proximately 20% of the Europeans signed by NHL clubs between 2001 and 2004.”); see also 
Bill Meltzer, Global Game: NHL Boasts a United Nations of Talent, NHL.COM, Sept. 28, 
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high levels of competition in the NHL, Europe’s most talented players fre-
quently choose to abandon their national teams. Further, foreign players 
often accept opportunities to play in the NHL without regard to their exist-
ing contractual obligations.  
The signing away of contracted players, or player poaching as it is 
commonly called, is an unfortunate occurrence in international ice hockey. 
Since the game lacks a powerful, supreme governing body,2 hockey leagues 
exist as sovereign entities and often disregard the rules governing their in-
ternational counterparts. Though historically prevalent, the issue of player 
poaching recently rose to the forefront of international ice hockey when 
Alexander Radulov signed a three-year deal with Russia’s newly-formed 
Continental Hockey League (KHL)3 while still under contract with the 
Nashville Predators.4 
This Note examines the regulations governing international player 
transfers in ice hockey and the concept of player poaching through the lens 
of the Alexander Radulov saga. Part II provides substantial background on 
the International Ice Hockey Federation (IIHF), the NHL Collective Bar-
gaining Agreement, the now-expired international Player Transfer Agree-
ment, and the history of player poaching. Part III discusses and analyzes the 
posting system,5 a method used to regulate international player transfers in 
Major League Baseball. Part IV proposes that the IIHF and NHL modify 
their current player transfer system by adopting a posting system and streng-
thening the IIHF.  
II. THE RISE AND FALL OF THE IIHF/NHL PLAYER TRANSFER AGREEMENT 
On July 11, 2008, Russian-born Alexander Radulov, a forward with 
the NHL’s Nashville Predators, signed a three-year contract with the KHL’s 
  
2007, http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=369417 (stating that “[a]mong all European 
hockey countries, Sweden has been the steadiest producer of NHL talent for over 30 years  
. . . . [O]n a per capita basis, however, there’s not a more impressive secondary producer of 
NHL talent than the Czech Republic.”).   
 2   See discussion infra Part II.A.  
 3   The KHL began play in 2008 and replaced the Russian Super League, which disbanded 
after the 2007–2008 hockey season. See NHL, Russian League Agree Not to Poach Players, 
CBC SPORTS, July 10, 2008, http://www.cbc.ca/sports/hockey/story/2008/07/10/nhl-russia-
players.html; see also Alessandro Seren Rosso, New Kontinental Hockey League Takes 
Shape, Sets Rules, EURO HOCKEY, Mar. 13, 2008, http://www.eurohockey.net/news/story. 
html?id=20080313111756newkontinentalhockeyleaguetakesshapesetsrules. 
 4   Joeri Loonen, Predator Inks Debatable Deal, INT’L ICE HOCKEY FED’N, July 11, 2008, 
http://www.iihf.com/home-of-hockey/news/news-singleview/browse/1/article/predator-inks-
debatable-deal.html?tx_ttnews%5BpS%5D=1214863200&tx_ttnews%5BpL%5D=2678399 
&tx_ttnews%5Barc%5D=1&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=187&cHash=bbe76c8329. 
 5   See discussion infra Part III.  
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Salava Yulayev Ufa.6 Questions immediately arose concerning Radulov’s 
breach of his NHL contract and the validity of his KHL agreement. When 
Radulov allegedly signed his KHL contract, the NHL and the KHL had no 
agreement in place to govern international player transfers or prevent player 
poaching.7 Though the IIHF has successfully brokered several Player Trans-
fer Agreements (PTAs)8 between the NHL and IIHF member bodies in the 
past, Russia has not signed a PTA with the NHL since 2005.9 Currently, no 
PTA exists10 between the NHL and IIHF member bodies,11 despite the 
IIHF’s frequent warnings that a lack of a PTA will result in chaos through-
out the hockey world.12  
A.  The International Ice Hockey Federation 
The IIHF is ice hockey’s world governing body. According to the 
IIHF Statutes and Bylaws, the IIHF formed in 1908 and its purpose is to 
“govern, develop and promote international ice and in-line hockey.”13 The 
IIHF Statutes and Bylaws go on to identify the IIHF’s intent “to establish 
and maintain clear jurisdiction over ice and in-line hockey international-
ly.”14 Sixty-eight countries have some form of IIHF membership15 and, 
therefore, are required to abide by the policies and regulations set forth in 
the IIHF Statutes and Bylaws. In addition to regulating the rules and mem-
ber bodies of international hockey, the IIHF also regulates all international 
  
 6   Loonen, supra note 4. 
 7   Though the NHL and the KHL agreed to a signing moratorium on July 10, 2008, KHL 
president Alexander Medvedev stated the Radulov signing occurred several days before the 
leagues reached an agreement. See NHL Not Interested in Compensation from Newly Formed 
Russian League, NHL.COM, Aug. 18, 2008, http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=380320#& 
navid=nhl-search. 
 8   See discussion infra Part II.B.  
 9   Alex Yannis, Russians Reject N.H.L. Player Transfer Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005, 
at D7. 
 10  See Allan Hougaard, IIHF Transfer Agreement Falls Apart After Czechs Opt Not to 
Extend Deal, HOCKEY NEWS, May 1, 2008, http://www.thehockeynews.com/articles/15728-
IIHF-transfer-agreement-falls-apart-after-Czechs-opt-not-to-extend-deal.html; see also dis-
cussion infra Part II.B. 
 11  See IIHF Member National Associations, http://www.iihf.com/iihf-home/the-iihf/ 
members.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2010). 
 12  See Yannis, supra note 9. 
 13  INT’L ICE HOCKEY FED’N, STATUTES AND BYLAWS art. 3 (2003) [hereinafter IIHF 
STATUTES & BYLAWS], available at http://www.iihf.com/fileadmin/user_upload/PDF/The_ 
IIHF/IIHF_Statutes_and_Bylaws-_July_2003.pdf. 
 14  Id. 
 15  IIHF Member National Associations, supra note 11. 
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hockey games, the IIHF World Championship tournament, and the various 
national teams that form for participation in the Olympics.16  
In addition to these basic functions, the IIHF also establishes 
ground rules for international player transfers.17 Under Article 205 of the 
Statutes and Bylaws, the IIHF is responsible for “ensur[ing] the good order 
of the sport internationally and, in relation to player movement, to safeguard 
the player and his position with regard to player eligibility for international 
competitions and to uphold discipline and maintain order between clubs and 
within the sport.”18 As such, the IIHF requires all players who wish to move 
to the national hockey association of a member country to obtain an IIHF 
international transfer card (ITC).19 Additionally, a player’s transfer becomes 
valid only upon confirmation by the IIHF.20 Further:  
When a player applies for an international transfer, the member national 
association of the country from which he is transferring in signing the 
transfer application shall be deemed to have confirmed that there is no rea-
son for them to prevent the player from transferring to the new club or na-
tional association.21  
With regard to player transfers to non-member organizations, the 
IIHF provides that if the organization and the IIHF have a PTA in place, 
then the IIHF will execute international player transfers in accordance with 
such an agreement.22 In contrast, players who leave member body organiza-
tions to play in non-member organizations without player transfer agree-
ments with the IIHF “will at all times be regarded as belonging to [their] 
original member national association.”23 The IIHF also reserves the right to 
discipline players who do not follow the international transfer procedures 
  
 16  See Eugene Belashchenko, Why Now for a Russia-NHL Agreement, HOCKEY’S FUTURE, 
July 12, 2008, http://www.hockeysfuture.com/articles/10487/why_now_for_a_russianhl_ 
agreement/. 
 17  Articles 205–210 of the Statutes and Bylaws outline the IIHF’s basic international trans-
fer regulations. IIHF STATUTES & BYLAWS, supra note 13, arts. 205–10. In addition, the IIHF 
has published International Transfer Regulations that offer significantly more detail on trans-
fer procedures, regulations, and penalties. INT’L ICE HOCKEY FED’N, INTERNATIONAL 
TRANSFER REGULATIONS (2009) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER REGULATIONS], 
available at http://www.del.org/fileadmin/content/downloads/IIHF/IIHF_International_Trans 
fer_Regulations_-_June_2009.pdf. 
 18  IIHF STATUTES & BYLAWS, supra note 13, art. 205. 
 19  Id. 
 20  Id. 
 21  Id. 
 22  IIHF STATUTES & BYLAWS, supra 13, art. 206. 
 23  Id. 
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outlined in the Statutes and Bylaws and the International Transfer Regula-
tions.24 
Although the IIHF lists the U.S. as a member country,25 the NHL is 
not an IIHF member association. While IIHF International Transfer Regula-
tions govern international player transfers between IIHF member bodies, the 
NHL must rely on an alternative international transfer system.26 In the past, 
the IIHF has brokered PTAs between the NHL and IIHF member bodies.27 
While the IIHF does not believe that PTAs are an unsuccessful method of 
governing international player transfers, numerous instances of player 
poaching have gone unpunished over the years.28 Even with the standing to 
regulate international contract dispute, the IIHF has struggled to put an end 
to this problem. While the NHL is not under IIHF jurisdiction, Russia, the 
Czech Republic, Sweden, and countless other hockey powerhouses are IIHF 
member bodies and, therefore, subject to IIHF regulations. Although the 
NHL’s membership within the IIHF would go a long way towards alleviat-
ing the problem of player poaching,29 it will not cure the illegal behavior of 
its international counterparts. While the IIHF could prohibit players who 
have engaged in illegal transfers from participating in IIHF international 
championship events,30 such punishments would not serve as adequate de-
terrents.31 Though the NHL reserves the right to punish players that leave 
their NHL teams for international clubs, the NHL has no standing to enforce 
such punishments overseas.32 The NHL, and all hockey leagues, should be 
able to rely on the authority of the IIHF, hockey’s self-proclaimed “world 
governing body,” with regard to international matters. The IIHF’s lack of 
actual authority, however, is alarming and shows the immediate need for 
reformation of both the IIHF-NHL PTA and the IIHF generally.  
B.  The NHL/NHLPA Collective Bargaining Agreement 
Pursuant to the NHL Standard Player Contract, the league requires 
all players to “play hockey only for the Club unless his SPC [Standard Play-
  
 24  Id. art. 209. 
 25  IIHF Member National Associations, supra note 11. 
 26  IIHF STATUTES & BYLAWS, supra note 13, art. 206; see also discussion infra Part II.C.  
 27  E-mail from Szymon Szemberg, Communications Director, IIHF, to Katherine Zdro-
jeski (Nov. 21, 2008, 08:53 EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Szemberg E-mail]. 
 28  See discussion infra Part II.C.  
 29  See discussion infra Part IV.A.  
 30  See Belashchenko, supra note 16.  
 31  See id. (stating that because of the high, tax-free salaries paid to KHL players, it is like-
ly that players such as Alexander Radulov and others will regard suspension from Olympic 
play merely as a cost of doing business).   
 32  See discussion infra Part II.B.  
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er Contract] is Assigned, Loaned or terminated by the Club.”33 Further, 
NHL clubs reserve the right to fine or suspend any player who engages in 
“conduct impairing the thorough and faithful discharge of the duties incum-
bent upon [him].”34 However, the NHL’s jurisdiction does not extend 
beyond its member clubs. Thus, the NHL has no standing to punish or sus-
pend from the game players who breach their contracts in search of more 
lucrative, international opportunities. Under the NHL and National Hockey 
League Players Association (NHLPA) Collective Bargaining Agreement 
(CBA), when an NHL player leaves his team before the term of his NHL 
contract has ended, the NHL deems him a “defected player.”35 The Com-
missioner of hockey may fine or suspend a defected player36 until he returns 
to his NHL club.37 Alternatively, if the player becomes free from obliga-
tions to the unaffiliated club via dissolution or completion of his obligations 
but does not contact the NHL Club with which he was last under contract, 
the Commissioner places his name on the “Free Agent List (Defected Play-
ers).”38 The meager penalties proscribed by the NHL CBA are not adequate 
disincentives or deterrents and will not keep players from defecting to other 
leagues.  
Alexander Radulov and several others39 have already left for the 
KHL, and some in the sporting world predict that more will follow.40 Sever-
al of the KHL’s bankrollers have recently achieved great wealth as a result 
of the discovery of natural resources and the rising price of oil.41 Subse-
quently, the KHL can ensure that its players are extremely well paid.42 
  
 33  See COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT BETWEEN NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE AND 
NATIONAL HOCKEY LEAGUE PLAYERS’ ASSOCIATION, STANDARD PLAYER CONTRACT, Exhibit 
1, art. 2(c) (2005), available at http://www.nhl.com/cba/2005-CBA.pdf. 
 34  See id. Exhibit 1, art. 4. 
 35  See id. art. 10.2(b)(i), (i)(A). 
[A]ny Player not unconditionally released . . . having had an SPC [standard player 
contract] with a Club, the provisions of which . . . have not been completely ful-
filled, contracts for a period including any part of the unfulfilled portion of the un-
fulfilled portion of his SPC, with a club in a league not affiliated with the NHL or 
with any such league . . . or with any other professional hockey club to the exclu-
sion of the said Club or its assignee. 
Id.   
 36  See id. art. 10.2(b)(ii). 
 37  Id.  
 38  Id. art. 10.2(b)(ii)(A)(1-6) (stating that a defected player becomes a regular free agent 
upon the fulfillment of one of six conditions). 
 39  See KHL Calls Off Truce, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Sept. 5, 2008, at D8. 
 40  See Belashchenko, supra note 1.  
 41  Id. 
 42  For instance, Alexander Radulov reportedly signed a tax-free deal with Salavat Ufa in 
Russia worth $13 million. Factoring out Tennessee state taxes, the deal is worth closer to $18 
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Moreover, due to the lack of a PTA, the IIHF cannot force defected players 
such as Radulov to return to the NHL. If the NHL and IIHF had some kind 
of PTA or player transfer system in place, the IIHF would have standing to 
suspend Radulov from play or force him into court to resolve his contractual 
issues. However, in the absence of such an agreement, the IIHF can do little 
more than deem such player actions “flagrant breach[es] of agreement.”43 
Further, other than the inability to play in Olympic or international competi-
tions, players have virtually no risk of repercussion should they choose to 
defect.44  
C.  The Player Transfer Agreement 
Though the NHL does not currently have a PTA in place with Rus-
sia or any other IIHF member body, the IIHF has brokered PTAs between 
such parties since the mid-1990s.45 The IIHF acts as a mediator, allowing 
the NHL and IIHF member bodies to negotiate PTAs amongst themselves. 
Ironically, the IIHF has indicated that it does not believe a transfer agree-
ment is the best method for regulating international player movement.46 
However, because the NHL CBA forbids NHL clubs from negotiating with 
IIHF affiliated teams on an individual basis,47 the IIHF agrees to broker 
PTAs.48  
In the past, a PTA outlined the procedures followed by the NHL 
and IIHF member bodies when contracted and non-contracted players desire 
international transfers to the NHL. The PTA is a one-way agreement and 
governs only player transfers from leagues participating in the PTA to the 
NHL.49 In 2005, the existing PTA expired, and Russia⎯home to the now 
extinct Russian Super League⎯elected not to sign the subsequent agree-
ment, citing displeasure with the terms of the agreement and the NHL’s 
  
million USD. Thus, Radulov stands to make roughly $6 million in 2008, the first of his three-
year deal, as opposed to the $984,000 he would have made under his NHL contract. See Ken 
Campbell, Battle Sure to Ensue over Radulov’s Three-Year, $13 million Russian Deal, 
HOCKEY NEWS, July 11, 2008, http://www.thehockeynews.com/articles/17153-Radulovs-
Russian-deal-would-be-violation-of-new-NHLIIHF-agreement.html. 
 43  See id. (quoting IIHF spokesman Szymon Szemberg). 
 44  See id.  
 45  See Russia Only Nation in IIHF Not to Sign New Transfer Agreement, CBS SPORTS, 
May 9, 2007, http://www.cbssports.com/nhl/story/10173472/rss.  
 46  Szemberg E-mail, supra note 27. 
 47  See id. 
 48  Id.  
 49  Player Transfer Agreement Signed, INT’L ICE HOCKEY FED’N, July 12, 2007, http:// 
www.iihf.com/home-of-hockey/news/news-singleview/article/player-transfer-agreement-
signed.html?tx_ttnews[pS]=1183240800&tx_ttnews[pL]=2678399&tx_ttnews[arc]=1&tx_ 
ttnews[backPid]=187&cHash=d93edbeb2f. 
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general lack of respect for Russian leagues and player contracts.50 Russia 
stated that it would negotiate its own player transfers with the NHL, but not 
until the NHL showed respect for Russian contracts.51 All involved parties 
agreed that brokering a transfer agreement without Russia⎯a hockey po-
werhouse⎯would be an extremely difficult task. The Czech Republic, 
another major player in the hockey world,52 nearly backed out of PTA nego-
tiations upon learning of Russia’s decision but ultimately decided to partici-
pate.53 The 2005 PTA was eventually signed but only for two years, in con-
trast to the previous PTA’s three.54 Russia’s lack of participation signaled 
the beginning of the end for hockey’s PTA.  
In 2007, after months of tumultuous negotiating, the NHL and six 
other IIHF member bodies ratified a new agreement.55 As in 2005, Russia 
refused to participate. The 2007−2011 PTA required the NHL to pay a flat 
fee of approximately $9,000,000 USD to the IIHF to be used as compensa-
tion for the first forty-five foreign players brought to the U.S.56  The fee 
earned IIHF teams approximately $200,000 per player sent to the NHL.57 
Each player in excess of forty-five, however, cost the NHL an additional 
$200,000.58 Further, the agreement required the NHL to pay an additional 
$50,000−$150,000 to the IIHF for any players not on an NHL roster for a 
minimum of thirty games.59 Undrafted or free agent players could sign with 
the NHL at any time.60 The 2007 PTA did not even survive the year.61 Un-
der the terms of the 2007 PTA, either side could choose to reopen the 
  
 50  Gennady Fyodorov, Russians Ready to Say “Nyet” to NHL Transfer Deal, REUTERS, 
May 8, 2007,  http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL088285920070508; see also Szemberg 
E-mail, supra note 27 (confirming that money and respect are the main issues the IIHF faces 
in brokering PTAs).  
 51  See Belashchenko, supra note 16.  
 52  See Bill Meltzer, Global Game: NHL Boasts a United Nations of Talent, NHL.COM, 
Sept. 28, 2007, http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=369417# (stating that “[o]n a per capita 
basis . . . there’s not a more impressive secondary producer of NHL talent than the Czech 
Republic.”).   
 53  See Belashchenko, supra note 1. 
 54  See Joeri Loonen, IIHF-NHL Player Transfer Agreement, EURO HOCKEY.NET, Aug. 17, 
2005, http://www.eurohockey.net/news/story.html?id=20050817160046iihfnhlplayertransfer 
agreement. 
 55  See Player Transfer Agreement Signed, supra note 49. 
 56  Id.  
 57  Id. 
 58  Id.  
 59  Id. 
 60  Id. 
 61  See European Countries Reopen Player Transfer Agreement with NHL, HOCKEY NEWS, 
Dec. 13, 2007, http://www.thehockeynews.com/articles/11896-European-countries-reopen-
player-transfer-agreement-with-NHL.html.   
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agreement prior to 2008.62 Both sides exercised the option but, unfortunate-
ly, no new agreement could be reached after the Czech Republic backed out 
of negotiations in May 2008.63  
IIHF member bodies and the NHL have indicated their willingness 
to work out a new PTA, however issues regarding respect and money ab-
ound.64 International leagues feel they are not being adequately compen-
sated for their players. They firmly believe that $200,000 is insufficient 
compensation for the premier players they send to the NHL.65 Further, they 
are frustrated by the fact that the NHL signs away their young talent. Unde-
veloped prospects often go to the NHL and simply are not ready for the 
major leagues. The home teams of these prospects are left incensed; instead 
of honing their craft in their home countries, top prospects are stuck in the 
U.S. playing minor league hockey. Though the payment of a fine helps to 
alleviate this issue for international leagues, it causes great consternation in 
the NHL, particularly for the NHL’s commissioner who would like to see 
his teams be more selective in the players they choose to bring in from 
overseas.66  
Brokering player transfer agreements has become an increasingly 
difficult task for the IIHF since 2005, and ultimately became impossible in 
2008. Though talks are ongoing, no new agreement is in place. On July 10, 
2008, Russia and the NHL agreed to a “signing moratorium” in which both 
sides agreed to the mutual respect of domestic contracts. However, the 
agreement lasted a mere twenty-four hours; on July 11, the KHL announced 
its deal with Predator’s forward Alexander Radulov.67 Prior actions by the 
NHL,68 coupled with the KHL’s refusal to suspend or return Radulov, have 
led to the general belief that the signing moratorium has been abandoned. 
The result is an increased risk of player poaching and a lack of compensa-
  
 62  Id. 
 63  Hougaard, supra note 10.  
 64  See Szemberg E-mail, supra note 27 (confirming that money and respect are the main 
issues the IIHF faces in brokering PTAs). 
 65  See Fyodorov, supra note 50 (quoting Russian Ice Hockey Federation President Vladis-
lav Tretiak) (“We don’t need handouts . . . . And to us a $200,000 sum is a handout. We 
know that players such as Malkin or Ovechkin are worth millions and we intend to fight for 
our rights in the courts.”).  
 66  See NHL, NHLPA and IIHF Talk Player Transfer Deal in Wednesday Meeting, HOCKEY 
NEWS, Jan. 16, 2008, http://www.thehockeynews.com/articles/12728-NHL-NHLPA-and-
IIHF-talk-player-transfer-deal-in-Wednesday-meeting.html?sort=upload%20DESC.  
 67  See Loonen, supra note 4.   
 68  The NHL’s Los Angeles Kings drafted and signed Russian prospects Andrei Loktionov 
and Vyacheslav Voinov in June 2008. Russia alleged that these players were under contract 
with the KHL and that their transfers should be voided. See Dispute Between KHL, NHL over 
Forward Radulov Could Go to Court, NHL.COM, Sept. 6, 2008, http://www.nhl.com/ice/ 
news.htm?id=381419#&navid=nhl-search. 
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tion for teams when players and free agents decide to leave and sign with a 
different league in a different country. 
D. Player Poaching and Contract Circumvention 
In recent years, several significant instances of player poaching 
have occurred, though none have been fairly or adequately resolved. In De-
cember 2005, the NHL’s Washington Capitals filed suit against Russian-
born athlete Alexander Semin.69 The NHL drafted Semin in 2002, and he 
signed a three-year contract with the Capitals.70 During the second year of 
Semin’s contract, the NHL suffered a season-long lockout, and the Capitals 
assigned Semin to their minor league affiliate, the Portland Pirates, for the 
2004−2005 season. Semin, however, never showed up to play for the Pi-
rates. Instead, he went back to Russia and played hockey for a private 
club.71 When the NHL contacted Semin, he said that Russia needed him to 
report for duty in the Russian military.72 The NHL subsequently discovered 
that Russia and Semin had worked out an “agreement” which allowed Se-
min to perform his military duty by playing hockey.73 Following the end of 
the NHL’s lockout, the Capitals demanded that Semin return to the U.S. and 
fulfill the remainder of his contract.74 In response, Russian officials in-
formed the Capitals that Semin’s military obligations would prevent him 
from doing so.75 The Capitals subsequently filed suit against Semin and, 
despite overwhelming evidence indicating that Semin’s military documents 
could not comport with Russian law, the court ultimately denied the relief, 
holding that the Capitals were unlikely to succeed on the merits of the 
case.76  
Less than two months later, the same court heard the case of Alex-
ander Ovechkin.77 The NHL’s Washington Capitals drafted Russian-born 
Ovechkin in 2004 and, due to the season-long lockout in 2004−2005, 
Ovechkin played his first game for the Capitals in 2005.78 Ovechkin’s for-
mer team, the Russian Super League’s Moscow Dynamo, filed suit against 
Ovechkin in January 2006 claiming that Ovechkin had a contract to play for 
  
 69  Lincoln Hockey, LLC v. Semin, No. A.05-02094 (HHK), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
34047, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2005). 
 70  Id.  
 71  Id. at *3. 
 72  Id.  
 73  Id.  
 74  Id. at *4. 
 75  Id.  
 76  Id. at *7–*8. 
 77  Moscow Dynamo v. Ovechkin, 412 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. Jan. 18, 2006).  
 78  Id. at 25. 
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Dynamo during the 2005−2006 season.79 The Russians claimed they had 
presented Ovechkin’s case to a Russian arbitrator who found Ovechkin in 
breach of his contract and banned him from play during the 2005−2006 
season.80 Russian Super League officials sought to have the arbitration 
award enforced in the U.S., but, following a hearing, the District Court con-
cluded it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case and dis-
missed the claim.81  
Shortly following the Ovechkin saga, the Russian Super League 
faced the departure of another marquis player⎯Evgeni Malkin, of Russia’s 
Metallurg Magnitogorsk.82 Despite tremendous pressure to fulfill his one-
year contract with Metallurg,83 Malkin provided his Russian team with the 
requisite notice84 of his resignation, signed a contract with the Pittsburgh 
Penguins, and slipped quietly away from Metallurg’s training camp to play 
for the NHL.85 Angered but undeterred, Metallurg sought the assistance of 
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York in obtaining 
an injunction to prevent Malkin from playing in the NHL.86 In its suit, Me-
tallurg alleged that the NHL and the Penguins “violated antitrust laws by 
conspiring in a group boycott and refusing to deal with Russian hockey 
clubs regarding player transfers” for the sole purpose of “punish[ing] [Rus-
sian hockey clubs] for the Russian Ice Hockey Federation’s rejection of a 
new general agreement governing the transfer of foreign players to the 
NHL.”87  
  
 79  Id. at 26. 
 80  Id.  
 81  Id. at 29.  
 82  See It’s Official: Penguins Sign Russian Star Malkin, ESPN.COM, Sept. 7, 2006, http:// 
sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=2574012. 
 83  Id.  
 84  Id. 
 85  According to several media outlets, Malkin wanted to pursue his professional career in 
the NHL and only signed a one-year contract with Metallurg to alleviate the pressure placed 
on him and his family by Russian team officials. See id. Almost immediately following the 
signing, Malkin disappeared from Metallurg’s training camp in Finland, fearing team offi-
cials might try to prevent him from leaving. See id. When asked about the pressure placed on 
Malkin to forgo the NHL and sign a one-year deal with Metallurg, Sergei Gonchar, Malkin’s 
Pittsburgh Penguins teammate, Sergei Gonchar, stated, “[h]e was very upset . . . . Hopefully, 
nobody is going to put pressure on his family or himself when he comes back [to Russia]. 
But at the same time, there’s got to be some pressure because otherwise a guy wouldn’t sign 
a deal at 3 a.m. then disappear . . . a couple days [later].” Posting of Larry Fitzgerald to 
http://www.ncaastrategies.com/utopia/showthread.php?p=1044066 (Aug. 16, 2005, 22:59 
EST). See also E.M. Swift, The New New Kid, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 2, 2006, at 70.  
 86  Russian Club Seeks to Stop Malkin from Playing in NHL, CBS SPORTS, Oct. 19, 2006, 
http://www.cbssports.com/nhl/story/9740727.  
 87  Id. 
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In deciding the case for the District Court, Judge Loretta Preska 
held that the Russians failed to meet the standard for a preliminary injunc-
tion as they could not show that Malkin’s absence caused his former team 
irreparable harm.88 In denying the injunction and dismissing the case, Judge 
Preska effectively kept Malkin and several other former Russian players in 
the NHL.89 As a nonparty to the IIHF/NHL PTA, the Russians received 
nothing in return for their players, save for a hefty legal fee and the rem-
nants of several unfulfilled contracts.90 However, whether or not the Rus-
sians had existing contracts with Semin, Ovechkin, Malkin, and others is 
hardly the issue. Indeed, Judge Preska noted in the Malkin case that the 
Russian teams seemed far less concerned with retaining top talent than they 
were with “wresting larger player transfer fees from the NHL.”91  
Additionally, due to the prevalence of alleged player poaching, 
league officials on both sides expend a wealth of time, money, and re-
sources on inevitably fruitless investigations. Moreover, the concerned par-
ties rarely achieve mutually agreeable results; the vast majority of player 
poaching cases never see the inside of a courtroom since the facts typically 
prove nothing more than a blatant disrespect for both contract law and the 
hockey leagues of other countries. Such incidents of player poaching sug-
gest that the IIHF only perpetuates a broken system by continuing to allow 
the IIHF/NHL PTA to govern international player transfers. IIHF officials 
do not believe PTAs are the best method of regulating player transfers,92 
and the acrimony between involved parties, along with the frequency of 
illegal player movement, makes it clear that a PTA is no longer a viable 
option. Moving forward, the IIHF should look for an entirely different solu-
tion and, in doing so, should model its solution based on the player transfer 
systems successfully implemented in other professional sports. 
III. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL’S POSTING SYSTEM 
Ice hockey is by no means the only sport with an international fol-
lowing, nor is it the only sport to face international player transfer issues. 
America’s premier baseball league, Major League Baseball (MLB) faced 
numerous problems with player transfers and player poaching throughout 
  
 88  See Russian Team’s Request for Malkin Injunction Denied, ESPN.COM, Nov. 16, 2006, 
http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/story?id=2663537. 
 89  See id. 
 90  However, even if they been party to the IIHF/NHL PTA, Russia would have received a 
mere $200,000 USD in exchange for Malkin—hardly a fair transfer fee for the second over-
all pick in the 2004 NHL draft. See IIHF Says Predators’ Radulov Wrong to Sign with Rus-
sian Club, NHL.COM, Oct. 1, 2008, http://www.nhl.com/ice/news.htm?id=384365.  
 91  See Russian Team’s Request for Malkin Injunction Denied, supra note 88.  
 92  See Szemberg E-mail, supra note 27. 
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the latter half of the twentieth century.93 As baseball expanded outside of 
the U.S., Japanese players began to play in MLB. Though MLB scouts 
widely considered Japanese talent inferior to that of MLB, a few Japanese 
prospects sparked major league interest. Beginning the middle of the twen-
tieth century, MLB contracted with several Japanese players without regard 
to their Japanese labor obligations.94 The frequency with which Japanese 
players circumvented the rules of their respective labor agreements rose 
dramatically in the late 1990s,95 ultimately resulting in a contentious rela-
tionship between MLB and its Japanese counterpart, Nippon Professional 
Baseball (NPB).  
Contractual problems between NPB and MLB began in the 1960s 
when Japan’s Nankei Hawks sent several prospects to the San Francisco 
Giants farm system to “hone their craft.”96 The Hawks and the Giants 
agreed to a baseball exchange program; the players remained under contract 
with their Japanese teams but fulfilled their contractual obligations with 
MLB.97 The agreement collapsed when the Giants realized the talent of Jap-
anese pitching prospect Masanori Murakami and added him to their major 
league roster in 1964.98 After Murakami turned in several impressive 
months of work during the 1965 season, the Nankei Hawks asserted their 
right to reclaim him.99 Disregarding the terms of the exchange program, the 
Giants refused to send Murakami back, despite the Hawks’ insistence.100 
The Murakami incident eventually led to a 1967 Working Agreement be-
tween MLB and Japan.101 Pursuant to the terms of the agreement, no team 
could attempt to sign a player from another league unless that player was a 
free agent.102  
  
 93  See Tom Singer, Matsuzaka Posting System’s Latest Gem: Relationship Between MLB, 
Japan League Long and Storied, MLB.COM, Nov. 14, 2006, http://mlb.mlb.com/news/ 
article.jsp?ymd=20061114&content_id=1740635&vkey=hotstove2006&fext=.jsp (discuss-
ing the history of how Japanese players came to play in MLB).  
 94  Id.  
 95  See Posting System, http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enwiki/2491784 (last visited Mar. 22, 
2010). 
 96  Singer, supra note 93.  
 97  Id. 
 98  Id. 
 99  Id. As a relief pitcher for the Giants in 1965, Murakami went 4-1 with eight saves dur-
ing forty-five appearances. Id. 
 100  Id. (“After he went 4-1 with eight saves in 45 relief appearances in 1965, Nankei as-
serted its rights to Murakami in what unraveled into a messy international affair.”). 
 101  Id. 
 102  See Michael Street, A Brief History of Japanese-American Baseball Relations, Part 2: 
The Tornado, EXAMINER.COM, Dec. 3, 2008, http://www.examiner.com/examiner/x-739-
AsianAmerican-Sports-Examiner~y2008m12d3-A-brief-history-of-JapaneseAmerican-
baseball-relations-Part-2-The-Tornado. 
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The agreement remained in place until the 1990s, when Japanese 
agent Don Nomura discovered a loophole in the NPB regulations that al-
lowed his client, pitcher Hideo Nomo, to circumvent the agreement.103 Ac-
cording the NPB rules, Japanese players obtained free agent status upon 
retiring from the league. In 1994, Nomo announced his retirement from 
Japanese baseball and, in doing so, effectively freed himself from all con-
tractual obligations to the Kintetsu Buffaloes.104 As the 1967 agreement did 
not restrain the movement of free agents, Nomo went on to sign a hefty con-
tract with MLB’s Los Angeles Dodgers.105 In 1997, Nomura used the same 
method to free twenty-one year old Alfonso Soriano from his contract with 
the Hiroshima Carp.106 The pilfering of Japanese talent became an issue for 
MLB as well when, in 1997, the San Diego Padres paid the Chiba Lotte 
Marines for the exclusive negotiating rights to pitcher Hideki Irabu.107 The 
Padre’s actions left MLB’s twenty-nine other teams infuriated; many 
wanted the chance to vie for Irabu’s services and felt they had been unfairly 
shut out of the wooing process.108  
The exodus of top Japanese talent to the U.S. led NPB to close the 
loophole in their regulations and seek an agreement with MLB and the 
MLB Player’s Association (MLBPA) governing international player trans-
fers.109 In 1998, the parties established the posting system, a one-way 
agreement regulating the transfer of players from NPB to MLB.110 Under 
the system, Japanese players with fewer than nine years of service111 allow 
their Japanese teams to “post” their availability to each of MLB’s thirty 
teams.112 If the Japanese team agrees, the player is posted between Novem-
ber 1 and March 1, and interested teams have four days to submit a blind 
  
 103  Singer, supra note 93. 
 104  Id. 
 105  See Street, supra note 102. 
 106  See id. Though the Carp insisted Soriano remain in Japan, MLB commissioner Bud 
Selig declared Soriano a free agent and allowed him to sign with the New York Yankees. Id. 
The Soriano incident proved to be the last straw for NPB. Following Soriano’s departure, 
NPB closed the loophole in their regulations and began working with MLB to establish a 
new player transfer system. Id. 
 107 Tim Kurkjian, Posting Process Needs to Be Altered, ESPN.COM, Dec. 15, 2006, http:// 
sports.espn.go.com/mlb/columns/story?columnist=kurkjian_tim&id=2697354. 
 108  See id. 
 109  See Street, supra note 102. 
 110  See Paul White, Japan Frets over Talent Exodus to USA, USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 2007, 
at 1C. 
 111  Once a player achieves nine years of service, he is eligible for free agency and may sign 
with any team he wishes, regardless of the league. See Barry M. Bloom, Tazawa Unlikely to 
Alter Asian Market, MLB.COM, Nov. 8, 2008, http://kansascity.royals.mlb.com/news/article. 
jsp?ymd=20081105&content_id=3665291&vkey=hotstove2008&fext=.jsp. 
 112  Singer, supra note 93. 
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bid to the MLB Commissioner’s Office.113 The bid represents the dollar 
amount the team would pay for the exclusive right to negotiate with the 
posted player.114 By bidding, each team vies merely for the right to nego-
tiate with the Japanese player and not the right to sign the player. The 
Commissioner’s Office then presents the Japanese team with the highest 
bid, and that team has four days to accept or reject it.115 If accepted, the 
player and MLB team may negotiate for thirty days.116 If the parties agree 
on a contract, the Japanese team receives the bid money and releases the 
player from his obligations to his Japanese team.117 If no deal is reached, no 
money exchanges hands; the player returns to his Japanese team and cannot 
be posted again for another year.118  
The posting system serves a twofold purpose. First, it allows MLB 
to protect smaller-market teams by giving every team an equal chance to bid 
for the negotiating rights to posted Japanese players. Additionally, the post-
ing system allows NPB to protect the integrity of its league and ensures that 
its team will receive adequate compensation for departing players.119 
The posting system is not without flaws, and critics are quick to 
point out its shortcomings.120 First and foremost, the posting system has 
shown that it may not achieve one of its main goals; small market teams are 
often left without a real opportunity to bid for top Japanese talent.121 For 
example, in 2006 the Boston Red Sox paid an astounding $51.1 million 
USD—$11 million more than the closest bidder—to the Seibu Lions for the 
right to negotiate with pitcher Daisuke Matsuzaka.122 The Red Sox ultimate-
ly agreed to terms with Matsuzaka on a six-year, $52 million contract, 
bringing the grand total to a whopping $103.1 million for Matsuzaka’s ser-
vices.123 In 2006, being the team with the second-highest payroll in MLB,124 
  
 113  Id. 
 114  See id. 
 115  Id. 
 116  Id. 
 117  Id. 
 118  See Posting System, supra note 95. 
 119  See Dan Sloan, Japan Player Posting System Needs Review, Say Yankees, REUTERS, 
Feb. 1, 2007,  http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSSP15866320070201 (stating that when the 
Boston Red Sox paid the Seibu Lions $51.1 million USD to negotiate with Daisuke Matsu-
zaka, the amount was reportedly equal to three times the Lions’ 2006 payroll). 
 120  See Kurkjian, supra note 107. 
 121  See Anthony Castrovince, Notes: Early Posting Results Unhelpful, MLB.COM, Nov. 17, 
2006, http://mlb.com/news/article.jsp?ymd=20061115&content_id=1741274&vkey=news_ 
mlb&fext=.jsp&c_id= (stating that the Cleveland Indians—a small-market team—lost out on 
the negotiating rights to two players they felt they bid for aggressively). 
 122  See Kurkjian, supra note 107. 
 123  This total does not include incentives, which, if realized, would make Matsuzaka’s 
contract worth as high as $110 million. Id. 
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the Red Sox could afford to aggressively pursue a player such as Matsuza-
ka. Other teams, however, did not enjoy the same luxury. At $51.1 million, 
the Red Sox’s bid money equaled more than half the total payroll for twen-
ty-five of the thirty MLB teams.125 Further aggravating this problem is the 
fact that bid money is not counted as part of a team’s yearly payroll.126 Big-
market teams, therefore, have no incentive to exercise cautious spending. 
Teams with the resources to do so can place outrageous bids on top talent, 
knowing that the money will go untaxed.  
Some teams with average payrolls may find ways to restructure 
their finances in order to liquidate the funds needed to place winning bids. 
However, the Red Sox set an unfortunate precedent when they bid for the 
negotiating rights to Daisuke Matsuzaka. Before the Matsuzaka bid, win-
ning bids under the posting system averaged between $300,000 and $1 mil-
lion USD per player.127 Moving forward, however, high-caliber players and 
their Japanese teams may come to expect comparable compensation.128 
Teams with the fewest financial resources stand little chance of successfully 
bidding on top talent. Moreover, exorbitant bidding acts as a deterrent in 
future posting situations. Small-market teams may refrain entirely from 
bidding, instead expecting that their richer counterparts will out-bid them if 
a prospect is worth pursuing.129  
Another issue within the posting system issue is the concept of “fo-
reclosure,” an anti-competitive tactic in which a team with no intention of 
signing a player places an outrageous bid for the sole purpose of freezing 
out the competition.130 Though the posting system comes with an implicit 
“good faith” clause, MLB has never established the penalty for bad faith. 
  
 124 USA Today, 2006 MLB Team Payrolls, http://content.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/ 
salaries/totalpayroll.aspx?year=2006 (last visited Mar. 22, 2010). 
 125  The Florida Marlins had the lowest payroll in 2006 at $14,998,500—less than one third 
of the Red Sox bid price. See id.  
 126  MLB does not have a salary cap, but it does impose a luxury tax upon its teams; teams 
whose payrolls exceed a certain amount are taxed on the excess. See Christine Snyder, Note, 
Perfect Pitch: How U.S. Sports Financing and Recruiting Models Can Restore Harmony 
Between FIFA and the EU, 42 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 499, 524 (2009). 
 127  Duane W. Rockerbie, Peculiarities of the Major League Baseball Posting System 2 
(July 2007) (Univ. of Lethbridge, Working Paper), available at http://web.uvic.ca/econ/ 
research/seminars/rockerbie.pdf. 
 128  In 2006, for example, the New York Yankees paid $26 million for the negotiating rights 
to Kei Igawa of the Hanshin Tigers. Kurkjian, supra note 107. 
 129  See Castrovince, supra note 121 (stating that conservative bidding comes with risks, 
that “small-market clubs can get left out” when bidding reaches the Matsuzaka level).  
 130  Rockerbie, supra note 127, at 8. Rumors initially circulated around the Matsuzaka trade 
suggesting that the Red Sox intended to bid excessively to keep Matuzaka out of the hands of 
their division rivals, the New York Yankees. See Jimmy Graham, The Matsuzaka Master 
Plan?, THESPORTSTRUTH.COM, Dec. 12, 2006, http://www.thesportstruth.com/categories/ 
daisuke-matsuzaka/.  
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Additionally, “bad faith” could come in varying degrees. Certainly, MLB 
would penalize a team for complete failure to negotiate with a player. How-
ever, what if a team negotiates but offers significantly less than a player’s 
projected worth⎯does this qualify as “bad faith?” During the Daisuke Mat-
suzaka bidding war, one critic of the posting system suggested that the Bal-
timore Orioles could use such a method to keep Matsuzaka out of the hands 
of its American League East Division rivals.131 He argued that the Orioles 
could make an outrageous bid and then make Matsuzaka a “take it or leave 
it” offer⎯a substantial amount of money132 but still less than his widely-
speculated market value.133 Matsuzaka, without the benefit of generating 
competing bids from other teams, would have to choose between the Ori-
oles’ low offer and continuing his tenure in Japan.134 If Matsuzaka accepted 
the deal, the Orioles would get a top pitcher at a bargain price.135 If Matsu-
zaka rejected the deal, the Orioles would, at the very least, keep him from 
signing with a rival team.136 Without a clear definition or penalties for bad 
faith, scenarios such as this one would go unchecked. Further, allowing 
teams to make anticompetitive bids for players they have no intention of 
signing would significantly compromise the integrity of the game and could 
jeopardize MLB’s relationship with NPB.  
Foreclosure could have serious repercussions not only in MLB, but 
also in NPB and for the individual players. For example, anticompetitive 
bids would deprive NPB of significant amounts of bid money. NPB does 
not enjoy the wealth of MLB and, despite their desire to keep their most 
talented players in Japan,137 the teams often rely on the winning bid money 
to support their franchises.138 Though the league does not derive its revenue 
solely from the posting system, NPB should not be deprived of an opportu-
nity to move a player in order to generate additional funding. From the indi-
vidual player’s perspective, foreclosure significantly restricts free move-
  
 131 See Buster Olney, In Pursuit of Matsuzaka, ESPN.COM, Nov. 1, 2006, http://insider. 
espn.go.com/espn/blog/index?entryID=2645543&name=olney_buster&action=login&appRe
drect=http%3a%2f%2finsider.espn.go.com%2fespn%2fblog%2findex%3fentry=ID%3d2645
543%26name%dolney_buster. 
 132  Ironically, Olney suggested the Orioles make an “outrageous” offer of $50 million. See 
id.  
 133  Olney suggested a ten year contract at $5 million per year. Id. 
 134  See id. 
 135  Id. 
 136  Id. 
 137  See White, supra note 110 (“The majority (of Japanese officials) believe we lose too 
many of the best players.”) (alteration in original) (quoting Nobusha Ito, Executive Director 
of baseball operations for the NPB). 
 138  2006 news reports indicated that the Seibu Lions were in the midst of financial difficul-
ty and would likely accept the Daisuke Matsuza bid amount. See Kurkjian, supra note 107. 
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ment. In the Orioles scenario, for example, Daisuke Matsuzaka would have 
been left to choose between an inadequate amount of money and another 
year with his Japanese team⎯both unsuitable alternatives. Foreclosure cuts 
off a player’s options and hurts both the player’s career and rival MLB 
teams with the resources and genuine desire to negotiate.  
While no method is foolproof, the posting system’s advantages 
outweigh its flaws. Though the Japanese, much like their Russian counter-
parts, have mixed feelings about the departure of their “national trea-
sures”139 for American leagues, NPB officials agree that the generous com-
pensation for departed players certainly softens the blow.140 Additionally, 
the bidding itself serves a dual purpose: it gives every team an equal oppor-
tunity to vie for the services of talented players and it forces teams to bid 
aggressively for players they want to pursue. Further, the bidding process 
offers the potential for greater benefit to Japanese teams, particularly when 
contrasted with the NHL’s flat-fee system.141 Instead of paying a fixed price 
for all players brought over from Japan, MLB teams are pitted against one 
another in the form of a silent auction.142 It naturally follows that the better 
the player, the higher the bids, thus the more likely that the former team will 
be compensated for the true value of a departing player. Additionally, since 
the posting system’s 1998 inception, MLB and NPB have had limited inci-
dents of player poaching and circumvention of contract law. 
IV. IMPLEMENTING A NEW INTERNATIONAL PLAYER TRANSFER SYSTEM 
Necessity mandates that an international sport has a working and ef-
fective system in place to govern international player transfers. Within the 
world of ice hockey, the historically prevalent tension between Russia and 
the NHL, coupled with the KHL’s potential for success, makes the need for 
international regulation all the more pressing. Such change can be accom-
plished in a series of steps that will significantly alter the way international 
hockey operates. 
A.  Relinquishing International Control to the IIHF 
First and foremost, hockey’s supreme governing body, the IIHF, 
needs to assert its power. The IIHF Statutes and Bylaws explicitly state that 
  
 139  White, supra note 110.  
 140  See Sloan, supra note 119. 
 141  Under the most recent NHL/IIHF PTA, the NHL paid IIHF member bodies a flat fee of 
$200,000 per player. See discussion supra Part II.C.  
 142  In 2000, the Seattle Mariners bid $13.1 million for the negotiating rights to Ichiro Suzu-
ki and later stated that while they were concerned with overpaying, they knew they needed to 
post at least $10 million to have a chance of winning the bidding war. See Kurkjian, supra 
note 107. 
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all IIHF member bodies are required to include, in their associations’ consti-
tution or equivalent document, a statute declaring that they and their teams 
will submit to and accept the binding decisions of the IIHF on all interna-
tional matters.143 However, this article of the Statues and Bylaws is pre-
ceded by a provision stating that the IIHF will recognize its member bodies 
as the supreme authorities on hockey in their individual countries.144 Article 
10 of the Statutes and Bylaws completely contradicts Article 11 and cuts the 
IIHF’s power off at the knees. The IIHF should begin its internal modifica-
tion by amending Article 10 so that IIHF member bodies retain supreme 
authority in their own countries, so long as their actions and governing 
documents comport with the standards set forth by the IIHF. Adding this 
single phrase would restrict little of IIHF member bodies’ individual power. 
In practice, the amendment would do little more than establish the IIHF as 
the ultimate authority on all issues relating to ice hockey. In reality, the 
IIHF already possesses this authority. Throughout the Statutes and Bylaws, 
the IIHF makes reference to its complete jurisdiction and its binding author-
ity. However, the IIHF continually states that its jurisdiction does not cover 
non-member bodies such as the NHL.145 Even when IIHF member countries 
become involved in legally questionable transactions with the NHL, the 
IIHF cannot interfere.146 For instance, although Russia is an IIHF member 
body, and the KHL’s signing of Alexander Radulov was a blatant example 
of player poaching, the IIHF closed the investigation after announcing that 
it had no standing to take Radulov to the International Court of Arbitration 
for Sport.147  
If the NHL became an IIHF member-body, a vast majority of inter-
national contractual issues would disappear. Pursuant to Articles 4 and 11 of 
the IIHF Statutes and Bylaws, IIHF member associations are bound by all 
regulations created by the IIHF.148 To that end, the IIHF has created Interna-
tional Transfer Regulations, a series of guidelines governing international 
  
 143  IIHF STATUTES & BYLAWS, supra note 13, art. 11. 
 144  Id. art. 10.  
 145  Szemberg E-mail, supra note 27 (“We are asked to broker as NHL clubs do not allow 
their clubs to do direct business with IIHF affiliated clubs.”). 
 146  See id. 
 147  See Graham Dunbar, IIHF: Radulov Was Wrong to Sign with Russian Club, USA 
TODAY, Oct. 1, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/hockey/2008-10-01-3074851221_ 
x.htm. 
 148  Articles 4 and 11 state, respectively, that the IIHF will establish Statutes, Bylaws, Regu-
lations and official playing rules to govern ice hockey and that, as a condition of membership 
in the IIHF, member countries must agree to abide by such documents. IIHF STATUTES & 
BYLAWS, supra note 13, arts. 4, 11. 
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player transfers between IIHF member bodies.149 Under Article 4.1 of the 
IIHF’s International Transfer Regulations:  
During the period of an existing contract a player shall not be approached 
by an official of any other club, or by a person in connection with any oth-
er club, in membership with another member national association or 
league with the goal of inducing the player to breach his current contract 
and to join a new club.150 
Two drastic changes would occur if the NHL became a part of the IIHF: 
first, all international player movement involving the NHL would be subject 
to the International Transfer Regulations.151 Second, the NHL would have 
the resources and international standing necessary to resolve issues of play-
er poaching as they arose.152 
Although joining the IIHF would alleviate the vast majority of the 
NHL’s international contractual issues, it is unlikely that the NHL will sur-
render its autonomy in such an extreme manner. However, even if the NHL 
refused to join the IIHF, a simple addition to the NHL/NHLPA CBA and 
the NHL’s Standard Player Contract could remove some of the incentives 
for player poaching and contract breach. The NHL need only put a clause in 
both the CBA and SPC requiring all players to submit to the final, binding 
authority of the IIHF on international matters. Then, should an international 
contract dispute arise, the IIHF would have the authority to resolve the mat-
ter, regardless of the existence of an international player transfer system.  
The NHL might try to oppose relinquishing international control to 
the IIHF, but in reality the NHL does not have any international standing. In 
fact, the proposed amendment actually increases the NHL’s power. By add-
ing to the CBA and SPCs, the NHL would create an avenue through which 
it could resolve international disputes. The benefit to the NHL of amending 
the CBA and SPCs is highlighted when contrasted with maintaining the 
status quo. At present, in the absence of a PTA, the NHL has no way of 
quickly or successfully resolving incidents such as the Alexander Radulov 
case. For the NHL, the projected success of the KHL means an increased 
risk that contracted and non-contracted players will depart for Russia.  
  
 149  INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER REGULATIONS, supra note 17, pmbl. 
 150  Id. art 4.1. 
 151  The success, or lack thereof, of the International Transfer Regulations is beyond the 
scope of this Note, as the NHL is not likely to become a member of IIHF. Because the NHL 
intends to remain a sovereign entity, it is more appropriate to consider an alternative interna-
tional player transfer system. See discussion infra Part IV.B.  
 152  However, subjecting the NHL to the International Transfer Regulations would likely 
eliminate most incidents of player poaching since such incidents occur most frequently be-
tween the NHL and IIHF member bodies.  
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Amending the IIHF’s Statutes and Bylaws as well as the NHL’s 
CBA and SPC would go a long way in alleviating the problem of player 
poaching and in empowering the IIHF to stop it. However, the proposed 
amendments are only the first step in correcting the problem. Since the NHL 
is not an IIHF member body, both parties need to establish a working inter-
national player transfer system. In doing so, the IIHF and the NHL should 
consider implementing a posting system, which is a method of player trans-
fer with a proven success rate in MLB. 
B.  A Posting Model 
Numerous incidents of player poaching and countless months of 
contentious negotiations make clear that the NHL and IIHF should move 
away from the traditional player transfer agreement. After ensuring that the 
IIHF will assert the power it proscribes to itself in its Statutes and Bylaws, 
and that the NHL will submit to the IIHF’s final authority, the parties 
should institute an entirely new international player transfer system. MLB 
has had success in transferring players from Japan since it adopted the post-
ing system in 1998. Given the abundant benefits of that system,153 the IIHF 
and the NHL should strongly consider instituting a similar method in ice 
hockey.154 In hockey, the posting system would apply to drafted, interna-
tional players not yet eligible for free agency and to veteran players under 
contract with foreign teams. Players would indicate their desire to be posted 
to their current team, and both posting and bidding would occur during a 
fixed time period. The IIHF should consider whether or not a player’s cur-
rent team should have the right to refuse a player’s request.155 Every inter-
ested NHL team would have the opportunity to submit a blind bid, with the 
winning bid presented to the player’s current team. The NHL’s winning 
bidder and the player would then have the opportunity to negotiate a con-
tract that, if successful, would result in payment of the bid money and ter-
mination of the player’s contract with the international team. If unsuccess-
ful, no money would change hands and the player would be ineligible for 
posting until the following year. Such a system could have an extremely 
  
 153  See discussion supra Part III.  
 154  The proposed system would only apply to international player transfers between the 
NHL and IIHF member bodies. Player transfers between IIHF member associations would 
continue to be governed by the IIHF International Transfer Regulations. However, if the 
posting system yielded positive results, the IIHF might consider implementing it on a larger 
scale. See discussion infra Part IV.C.  
 155  In MLB, a player’s current team has the right to refuse to post that player’s availability. 
In hockey, however, tensions between the NHL and foreign hockey leagues, particularly the 
KHL, could lead to unwarranted refusal of a player’s request. Even resistant teams, however, 
might be swayed by a substantial bid price. Forcing teams to post their players’ availability 
could lead to more just results. See Posting System, supra note 95. 
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positive effect on both hockey’s international player transfers as well as the 
relationships between the NHL and IIHF member associations.  
A large part of Russia’s discontent with the PTA stems from the 
fact that it does not feel it is adequately compensated for the talented players 
it loses to the NHL. Other European leagues recently indicated their support 
for Russia’s position when they opted to reopen the 2007 PTA mere months 
after it was signed. Foreign hockey leagues feel that $200,000 USD per 
player is simply inadequate.156 In some cases, the amount drastically under-
values the talent of the player. NHL club owners, however, believe that they 
often pay hefty prices for players whose talent remains undetermined. Im-
plementing a method such as the posting system would undoubtedly help to 
derive the true value of a player. An arrangement of this kind would be 
agreeable to all sides; the NHL would alleviate the financial burden of 
overpaying for raw, undeveloped talent, and IIHF teams would receive ap-
propriate compensation for their most prized prospects.  
Additionally, the NHL’s commissioner has indicated that he would 
like his teams to be more selective in the athletes they choose to bring in 
from overseas.157 He is concerned with the amount of money the NHL is 
paying in fines to the IIHF for players not on NHL rosters for a minimum of 
thirty games.158 Foreign leagues, on the other hand, remain frustrated by the 
fact that the NHL scoops up homegrown talent with little intention of ac-
tually using it. The negotiation portion of the posting system, however, 
would substantially alleviate both of these concerns. First, “fines” for play-
ers that do not see enough playing time would become unnecessary and a 
non-issue. After a player’s current team accepts the bid for that player, the 
player and the prospective team would have a fixed period of time⎯thirty 
days in MLB⎯to work out a contract. By signing a contract, the player’s 
services become the property of an NHL team for a fixed number of years, 
and the NHL would avoid fines owed to the player’s former team. A player 
would likely refuse to sign a one-year deal, but even if he did, at its expira-
tion, he would be free of contractual obligations and could become an inter-
national free agent. Leagues concerned with retaining their homegrown 
talent could also find relief in the posting system, since the NHL would now 
have an incentive not to overpay for underdeveloped talent.159 Alternatively, 
the IIHF could mandate that players not yet eligible for free agency, but 
  
 156  See discussion supra Part II.  
 157  See NHL, NHLPA and IIHF Talk Player Transfer Deal in Wednesday Meeting, supra 
note 66.  
 158  Id.  
 159  See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
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desirous of international transfer, must obtain approval from their current 
teams before their availability can be posted.160  
Arguably more important than the posting system is the IIHF’s role 
in international player transfers and the NHL’s submission to IIHF authori-
ty. If the IIHF exercises the power it has reserved for itself, if the NHL 
submits to the IIHF on international matters, and if contracts are respected 
and breaches penalized, the problem of player poaching should diminish 
drastically.  
C. Potential Problems 
Although MLB has enjoyed modest success since the inception of 
its posting system, the success has been just that: modest. In the history of 
the league, only thirty Japanese players have ever donned an MLB uniform, 
and only twelve Japanese players have come to America via the posting 
system since its inaugural transfer in 1998.161 While the posting system has 
proven effective for MLB, it has only been applied on a very small scale, 
and the NHL is home to significantly more international players. In the 
2002–2003 season, the NHL housed 299 foreign players⎯nearly double the 
amount that played in the league during 1994–1995 season (156) and more 
than five times the amount that played during the 1986–1987 season (54).162 
The dramatic increase in the NHL’s foreign athletes over the past two dec-
ades indicates that it will be critical to consider the effect of implementing a 
posting system on such a large scale.  
The IIHF could consider altering the posting system by adding a 
provision that would make the system more conducive to operation on a 
large scale. Under a different international player transfer system,163 teams 
are free to negotiate internationally amongst themselves. Players can request 
an international transfer, and individual teams can also transfer players in-
  
 160  But see IIHF STATUTES & BYLAWS, supra note 13, art. 10. 
The member national associations of the IIHF shall recognize each other as being 
solely empowered to control ice and/or in-line hockey in their respective countries; 
therefore, they undertake that neither they nor any of their members will in any 
way have relations with nonassociated bodies or one of their members, except as 
may be permitted by Statutes and Bylaws or with special permission of the IIHF 
President for limited time periods. 
Id. 
 161  See Rockerbie, supra note 127, at 2 (citing Baseball-Reference.com, Posting System, 
http://www.baseball-reference.com/bullpen/Posting_System (last visited Mar. 22, 2010)). 
 162  See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, THE BOTTOM LINE: OBSERVATIONS AND ARGUMENTS ON THE 
SPORTS BUSINESS 52 (2006).  
 163  See Rockerbie, supra note 127, at 3 (describing the English Premier League’s interna-
tional player transfer system, in which clubs can negotiate internationally and players can be 
transferred internationally without their consent).  
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ternationally without their consent. Allowing individual NHL and interna-
tional teams to negotiate would likely lessen the strain on the posting sys-
tem and make it possible for it to be conducted on a smaller scale. However, 
such a provision might cause unrest amongst the players, as it is likely that 
they will not want to be transferred to another country without their consent. 
To that end, the IIHF could implement a regulation requiring all leagues to 
place an international transfer clause in every player contract. At signing, 
players would be given the option of either retaining the possibility of inter-
national transfer for the length of their contract or forgoing it entirely. 
Should they choose to accept, players would retain the option of requesting 
an international transfer at some point during the life of their contracts, but 
their teams could also subject them to a nonconsensual international trans-
fer. Should they decline, they could not be internationally trans-
ferred⎯willingly or otherwise⎯until the expiration of their contracts. They 
would, however, remain eligible for national trading. Such a provision 
would provide players with a voice while also reducing the strain on the 
posting system.  
A second problem with MLB’s player transfer method is that it is a 
one-way system. With the development of the KHL and the strong likelih-
ood of success, it is already apparent that the IIHF needs a better system to 
govern player transfers not only to and from the NHL, but also to and from 
hockey leagues around the globe. A universal posting system shared by all 
hockey leagues would be extremely intricate and could become quite messy. 
However, if the IIHF were able to find a successful method⎯such as the 
posting system⎯and test it first on a smaller scale, it might be able to make 
appropriate adjustments and apply the system universally.  
Another potential issue with the posting system is the likelihood 
that small market teams will get shut out of the bidding process. One of the 
benefits of paying a flat fee for all international players is that it is arguably 
fair to all teams interested in those players. Under a bidding system, teams 
with the deepest pockets will simply go after the players they want very 
aggressively and, as has happened in MLB, small market teams will not be 
able to compete. The same likelihood exists, however, under the current 
flat-fee system. If big market teams can afford to bid exorbitantly for play-
ers and still have money left over to sign those players to contracts, then it is 
equally as likely that those same teams can afford to spend $200,000 on 
player transfer fees. In fact, it is likely that a posting system will act as an 
equalizer. Hockey does not enjoy the wealth of MLB, and since the price of 
player contracts might soon be on the rise,164 NHL teams are likely to be 
more selective in the players they bring overseas. Alternatively, the NHL 
could take MLB’s posting system one step further by factoring the bid price 
  
 164  See discussion supra Part II.B.  
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into the winning team’s salary cap. Individual teams, however, will likely 
take issue with this policy and will not want to be taxed on money they are 
not spending on player salaries. An alternative and more mutually agreeable 
solution might be for the NHL to tax only a percentage of the bid price.  
D. Effects on Players 
It is important to consider the effect a new transfer system will have 
not only on the managers, owners, and league officials, but also on the play-
ers themselves. One of the drawbacks to MLB’s posting system is the risk 
of foreclosure⎯teams submitting outrageous bids for the sole purpose of 
winning the bidding war and keeping their rivals from negotiating with ta-
lented players.165 Foreclosure threatens not only competition, but also the 
free movement of individual players. It has yet to officially become an issue 
in MLB, largely because of the limited number of worthwhile Japanese 
prospects. However, given the sheer volume of international players that 
come to the NHL, teams will undoubtedly have a wealth of talent to choose 
from. Such endless options could potentially entice teams to bid on and ne-
gotiate with the players they want while simultaneously bidding excessively 
on other players in an effort to keep rival teams from obtaining foreign tal-
ent. Additionally, should the IIHF choose to implement a mandatory inter-
national transfer clause into player contracts, player movement could be 
restricted even further.166  
Players, however, will likely be the biggest beneficiaries of the 
posting system. The nature of the bidding component coupled with the 
KHL’s potential for success167 will likely drive up the value of player con-
tracts in the coming years. Russia has long been one of the strongest hockey 
nations on the globe, and, given its projected ability to bankroll a new hock-
ey league,168 it has the ability to provide homegrown talent with numerous 
reasons to stay in Russia. To that end, if the NHL wants to remain the 
world’s premier league, it must continue to house the world’s premier tal-
ent. Under the posting system, it will only be able to do this if the price is 
right. Top players will also expect competitive salaries and, in that sense, 
they will follow the money. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The tumultuous history of ice hockey’s PTA indicates that the sys-
tem is no longer a workable solution to the problem of player poaching. The 
  
 165  See discussion supra Part III. 
 166  See discussion supra Part IV.B.  
 167  See discussion supra Part II.  
 168  See Belashchenko, supra note 1.  
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two-step solution of granting the IIHF regulatory power over the NHL in 
international matters and implementing a posting system such as that in 
MLB will likely resolve a significant number of the contractual issues pla-
guing international ice hockey.  
No solution will be without flaws. Worse, however, would be the 
lack of any legal regulation of international player transfers. The nonexis-
tence of a binding system breeds disrespect for the law and contracts of all 
hockey leagues and their respective countries and creates a chaos from 
which no one benefits, and only the game suffers.  
 
